The boom and subsequent bust of housing construction and prices over the 2000s is widely regarded as a principal contributor to the fi nancial panic of 2007 and the ensuing "Great Recession." Much has been written about the demand side of this pronounced housing cycle, in particular the innovations in mortgage fi nance and the loosening of underwriting standards that greatly expanded the pool of potential homebuyers. In this paper, we take a closer look at developments on the supply side of the housing market, and bring prior theories and previous analysis of housing supply face-to-face with data from the 2000s cycle. We focus our discussion on four key issues. First, how much excess housing production occurred during the boom phase of the cycle and how far along is the correction? Second, we look at trends in the characteristics of new single-family homes built prior to, during, and after the construction boom to assess what effect, if any, the boom may have had on those trends. Our third question is how the homebuilding industry changed as prices boomed during the 2000s. Finally, we address the important question of whether large developers reaped excess profi ts from the boom, or whether excess demand simply drove up land values in specifi c markets, enriching landowners. Much has been written about the demand side of this pronounced housing cycle, in particular the innovations in mortgage finance and loosening of underwriting standards that greatly expanded the pool of potential home buyers. In this paper, we take a closer look at developments on the supply side of the housing market, and bring prior theories and previous analysis of housing supply face-to-face with data from the 2000s cycle. We focus our discussion on four key issues. Another 1.3 million loans are currently 90 or more days delinquent and very likely to move into the foreclosure process.
Much has been written about the demand side of this pronounced housing cycle, in particular the innovations in mortgage finance and loosening of underwriting standards that greatly expanded the pool of potential home buyers. In this paper, we take a closer look at developments on the supply side of the housing market, and bring prior theories and previous analysis of housing supply face-to-face with data from the 2000s cycle. We focus our discussion on four key issues. Another 1.3 million loans are currently 90 or more days delinquent and very likely to move into the foreclosure process.
First, how much excess housing production occurred during the boom phase of the cycle and how far along is the correction? While it is now clear that too much housing was built in the US in the boom phase, identifying how much and where overbuilding occurred remain important issues. We also explore the issue of whether supply elasticity played a role in that geographic dispersion. Our results suggest that 3 to 3.5 million excess housing units were produced during the boom. Excess housing production was a national phenomenon, but excess supply is positively related to housing supply elasticities.
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-2 -Second, we look at trends in the characteristics of new single-family homes built prior to, during, and after the construction boom to assess what effect, if any, the boom may have had on those trends. The number of excess units put in place during the boom is only a partial measure of its distortive effect on resource allocation; to be complete we must also understand the quality of those units. The effect of booms on asset quality is ambiguous in theory, so evidence from the housing market, where the quality of new construction compared to the existing stock is relatively easy to measure, is valuable. We find that throughout the boom, the quality of new units -both observable and unobservable -appears to have remained high.
Our third question is how the homebuilding industry changed as prices boomed during the 2000s. We present new evidence regarding the restructuring of the industry that took place from the mid 1990s to the mid 2000s and ask whether this restructuring may have contributed in some way to the over building that took place. We find that a significant amount of consolidation occurred in the industry over this period, as large builders got larger and increasingly relied on the equity markets to finance their projects. These large builders appear to have been major contributors to oversupply as they had projects in the pipeline even after prices began to fall, and in spite of the fact that capital markets signaled this risk well before banks began to tighten lending standards.
Finally, we address the important question of whether these large developers reaped excess profits from the boom, or whether excess demand simply drove up land values in specific markets, enriching landowners. We present new evidence on transaction volumes and prices for vacant land during the boom and bust, and combine them with our estimates of excess returns in the building industry. In addition, we examine whether large builders earned on average excess returns over this period of consolidation. In addition, we explore whether any excess returns were higher during the height of the housing boom. These data allow us to conclude that both builders and landowners shared in the excess profits generated by the boom.
-3 -
Literature Review
Among our four questions, the first -documenting excess supply and its sources -has received the most attention in previous literature. There is considerable interest in evaluating the efficiency of various asset markets, including housing. Case and Shiller (1989) report evidence of serial correlation in quality-adjusted housing returns. If housing markets were fully efficient, then future housing returns could not be predicted based on current information. There are frictions on both the demand side and the supply side of the housing market that might lead to imperfect arbitrage. On the demand side, housing is heterogeneous in a number of dimensions and there are significant transaction costs associated with buying and selling property. On the supply side, there are time frictions involved in the supply of new housing that limit how quickly builders can respond to any mispricing. There may also be costs of adjustment in housing supply that cause builders to spread any supply response out over time (Topel and Rosen (1988) ). These results imply that builders could get caught with excess supply in the pipeline if prices turn quickly and unexpectedly. Rosenthal (1999) tests for inefficiencies on the supply side taking into account that builders cannot instantaneously supply new housing to the market. He uses data on single family detached housing sales in Vancouver, BC from 1979 to 1989 to estimate a quality-adjusted price of housing using hedonic regressions. An error correction model is estimated to determine how quickly deviations in quality-adjusted prices from building costs are dissipated. The results for a standard building indicate that 96 percent of a short-run price shock disappears within two quarters. When estimates of these price shocks are added to a construction equation, they are not significant. This is consistent with additional evidence that during this period builders required two to three quarters to complete a construction project. Consequently, the observed price shocks were on average too short-lived for builders to earn excess profits by adjusting their construction activity in response to the shocks. Rosenthal concludes that any inefficiencies must originate in the land markets. Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz (2008) explore the role of housing supply elasticity in how possible housing bubbles would manifest themselves in different markets. Their model predictions are that any irrational demand during a bubble will result in higher prices and a more -4 -prolonged duration of the bubble in markets where housing is less elastically supplied. In contrast, in markets with relatively elastic supply, bubbles should result in more new residential investment and consequently less of a price response. This muted price response also makes it likely that the bubble will be shorter in duration. They test these predictions using the proxy for housing supply elasticity developed in Saiz (2008) .
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While an elastic supply of housing can limit the price rise associated with a temporary period of irrational exuberance in demand, given the durability of housing the larger supply response during the boom means that prices may fall below their pre-boom levels once demand again reflects fundamental factors.
Their estimates confirm that prices react relatively more than quantities in housing markets with inelastic supply, and that as a consequence periods of significantly high prices relative to replacement costs on average last longer. However, they note that several of the markets that experienced the largest booms in the recent cycle have high measured supply elasticities. These markets also demonstrated little variability of prices relative to replacement costs prior to the recent cycle. While having an elastic housing supply limits the likelihood of a serious housing bubble in a local market, it clearly does not prevent one from happening.
3 This is illustrated in Figure 1 which contrasts two local housing markets -one with a completely inelastic short-run housing supply curve, S(I), and one with an elastic short-run supply curve, S(E). The replacement cost of housing is given by C and initially both markets start out with prices equal to replacement cost at point A. A housing bubble develops which shifts out housing demand in both markets from D 0 to D 1 . There is no supply response in the inelastic market so prices ration this irrational exuberance by increasing to P 1 (I) as indicated at point C. In contrast, in the elastic supply market both prices and new housing supply react to the outward shift in demand. As a consequence, prices adjust by less than in the inelastic market Housing supply is nearly completely inelastic at the current stock of housing for prices below replacement costs ). This implies that if housing demand reverts back to its pre-boom level when the bubble bursts, then prices will overshoot to the down side in elastically supplied markets.
-5 -rising only to P 1 (E) as indicated at point B. When the bubble bursts, assume that demand reverts back to D 0 . Prices in the inelastic market decline back to their pre-bubble level of P 0 . However, due to the new housing supply added to the elastic market and the durable nature of housing, prices in the elastic market overshoot on the downward side to P 2 (E) < P 0 .
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There is also an emerging literature on rational models of overbuilding. DeCoster and Strange (2010) argue that rational overbuilding may occur in markets with uncertainty due to herding behavior by builders. They explore statistical and reputational models of herding behavior (see Banerjee (1992) and Welch (1992) . In statistical herding, a builder may choose to ignore a bad signal about future demand prospects in the market if this builder can infer that other builders have received more positive signals. This tendency to ignore bad signals is more pronounced if the market is characterized by leading builders who are perceived as having high quality information regarding market conditions and who may act as "first movers" in the market. In a market characterized by a few large builders and many small builders, statistical herding is most likely to be exhibited by the small builders who are attempting to free ride on the information gathered and acted upon by the large builders. Changes in market structure in the building industry can impact the likelihood of overbuilding due to statistical herding. As a market becomes more concentrated, there is a tradeoff between the increased likelihood that the smaller builders will discount their signals and follow the market leaders and the possible greater reliability of the signals received by the market leaders. Reputational herding may take place if banks have imperfect information on the quality of developers. The likelihood that a bank will cut off funding to a particular builder may be lower if that builder mimics the actions taken by another builder. This type of herding adds noise to the signal that the bank uses to attempt to discriminate between the builders.
As fundamental demand begins to expand in the elastic supply market, prices will adjust upward but there will initially be no new building activity. Once prices have recovered to the replacement cost, new supply will again be added to the market. Overbuilding to the extent that it occurs has important consequences for local housing markets. 1970s. However, the underlying demographic conditions of the country were fundamentally different in these two periods. These underlying demographic dynamics can have important long-term impacts on the level of demand for housing (Mankiw and Weil (1989) ). As shown in Figure 3 , up until the mid-1970s, the number of people in the 25 to 34 year age group (the post WWII baby boom) was growing very rapidly. People at this stage of the life-cycle tend to establish independent households for the first time such that the headship rate for this age group is quite a bit higher than for people under 25 years of age (Figure 4 ). In the second half of the 1970s, the number of people in the 35 to 54 age group, whose headship rate makes another distinct jump upward, began to increase rapidly. These age-specific population growth rates, along with some increase in age specific headship rates, resulted in a rising aggregate headship rate ( Figure 5 ). This meant that the demographically driven number of households was rising quite a bit faster than the underlying population.
In contrast, from the mid-1990s through the mid-2000s the number of people in the 25 to 34 year age group was actually declining, while the growth rate of those 35 to 54 years of age was slowing sharply. At the same time, the number of people aged 55 to 64 was rising rapidly.
In addition, headship rates for individual age cohorts generally peaked in the 1980s and have since been relatively stable to slightly declining. These factors combined to keep the overall U.S. headship rate essentially flat since the mid-1980s. As a result, the underlying trend growth -7 -of the number of households was limited to the growth of the population, which was slowing rapidly from the mid-1990s onward. Thus, referring back to Figure 2 , from a demographic perspective, housing starts per 1000 people should have continued to trend gradually lower from the mid 1990s onward. The order of magnitude of the resulting over building relative to underlying demographic trends can be estimated in different ways with different data sources.
But as we shall see, the resulting estimates are roughly similar.
One approach is based on the Census Bureau's Housing Vacancy Survey. This survey provides quarterly estimates of the stock of housing and its occupancy status. Figure 6 presents an aggregate vacancy rate for the US housing stock based on that data. To construct this vacancy rate, the numerator is the number of units vacant for rent, vacant for sale, and units in the category "held off the market for other reasons". The number of units in this latter category has historically been quite modest and usually reflected units in the probate process. However, the number of units in this category has risen rapidly over the recent past, apparently reflecting units An alternative measure of the amount of over-building that occurred is the difference between the cumulative sum of the number of housing units started relative to the amount of new housing units needed to meet the trend rate of growth of the number of households. Figure 8 provides such an estimate. Based on the rate of growth of the population and its age structure, we estimate that the trend rate of growth of households over the period since the mid 1990s is about 1.17 million per year. Due to losses from the existing stock due to fires, floods, and obsolescence, we estimate that about 1.4 million housing starts per year are needed to provide housing for the 1.17 million new households. Starting from 1995 we cumulate the number of housing starts minus 1.4 million (the blue curve) and the change in the number of households minus 1.17 million (the green curve). The difference between the two curves is an estimate of over production. Strictly from the stand point of production, the maximum overbuilding was achieved in 2007Q2 at about 3.4 million units. However, likely due to the strength of the economy and labor markets, household formations were running above trend at that point, so relative to the actual number of households the peak excess production occurred in 2009Q1 at around 3 ½ million units. In terms of both timing and number, this result is similar to that based on the vacancy data. million trend, such that as of mid 2012 the excess production that began in the mid to late 1990s has been worked off. However, due to the weakness of the economy, the rate of household formations has fallen well below trend. Thus, while from a pure production standpoint we no longer have an excess supply, vacancy rates remain above their longer run equilibrium values.
Figure 9 provides addition insight into the issue of household formations. Not only are they running well below the demographic trend, the growth that is occurring is more than accounted for by renter households while owner households continue to decline. While still at relatively low levels, over the past year there has been a considerably larger percentage increase of multifamily housing starts than of single-family starts.
-9 - West's share of excess units declined significantly, the South's share declined modestly, while the shares of the Northeast and Midwest increased by about 4 and 5 ½ percentage points, respectively. Of course, these changes reflect both trends in housing production and demographic trends such as relative population growth rates.
To focus specifically on the issue of excess production and where it occurred, Figure 11 presents a scatter plot of combinations of population growth and housing starts per 1000 people for each of the individual states. Each of the blue dots in the chart represents population growth (expressed at a compound annual rate) over the period from 1990 to 2000 and the average level of housing starts per 1,000 people over the same time period for each of the 50 states. Note the fairly tight positive relationship indicated by the close clustering of the blue dots relative to the regression line. Focusing on this period, the supply side of the housing market showed a tremendous ability to scale production rates to a wide variation in local population growth rates.
There is no evidence that housing supply lagged population growth by any significant degree even in the fastest growing states such as Arizona and Nevada. The red dots in Figure 11 represent the combinations of population growth rates and housing starts per 1,000 people for each state over the period from 2000 to 2005. Note that virtually all states moved to the right relative to the earlier decade, meaning an increase in housing starts for a given population growth rate. That is, the housing boom from a supply perspective was to a degree a national phenomenon. The magnitude of shift, however, tended to -10 -be larger for those states that experienced above average population growth in the 1990s. This can be seen for three of the four "sand states". 6 The population growth rate in Florida was fairly constant relative to the 1990s, while the rate of housing supply per capita nearly doubled.
Arizona experienced a slight slowing in its population growth rate, but like Florida its rate of housing supply per capita increased significantly, growing by roughly a third. Unlike the other sand states, Nevada experienced a significant slowdown in its rate of population growth.
However, the rate of housing supply in Nevada in 2000-2005 did not respond to this slowdown, resulting in Nevada's red dot being significantly to the right of the regression line. 7 Three other states that stand out in Figure 11 in terms of a high rate of housing construction relative to population growth are Georgia, North Carolina and South Carolina. The fact that housing supply increased relatively the most in these three states as well as the sand states may reflect that home builders were producing a product geared toward people at the later stages of their careers who might be looking for a second home or a retirement home. plot elasticities of supply as estimated by Saiz (2010) , where all of the elasticities for the MSAs in a state were averaged to provide a state estimate.
The "sand states" refer to Arizona, California, Florida and Nevada.
Also shown is a least squares regression line fitted through the scatter diagram. While there is a great deal of dispersion around that line, the upward slope is statistically significant (t statistic of 3.74). Similarly, Figure 13 presents the relationship between that same estimate of supply elasticity and the cumulative percent change of house prices over the period from 2002 to 2007. In this case the negative slope of the regression line is statically significant. (t statistic of -3.33) .
7 California is the only sand state that did not have a population growth rate in the 1990s that exceed the national average. California's rate of housing supply in the 1990s was not significantly higher than what would be predicted from the regression relationship. During the boom, California's rate of housing supply did increase, but this increase only moved it to the regression line and not to the right of the regression line. 8 It should be noted, however, that housing starts are not necessarily the same as net additions to the stock of housing due to destruction and demolition of existing units. 9 Note that North Dakota was dropped from this diagram as it represented an extreme value for percentage difference from the regression line.
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Trends in Size, Amenities, and Quality
New homes produced for sale have been getting larger, with more bedrooms, bathrooms, and garages, for quite some time. Figure 14 presents the median size of new homes sold, measured in square feet, for the period from 1978 through 2011.
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Of course, changes in physical characteristics such as square footage and number of bathrooms do not capture changes in quality, such as the materials used and the level of skill and care employed in construction. It is certainly conceivable that as demand for new homes intensified the quality of new homes, defined in this manner, slipped somewhat. To shed some light on this issue, we used American Housing Survey (AHS) data to estimate the percentage premium than home buyers place on new homes versus existing homes. All else equal, a new home is likely to command a premium as it is likely to require lower maintenance expenditures over an expected holding period. By estimating that premium for AHS surveys before and during the construction boom, we can observe how that premium changed over time. 
Trends in the Home Building Industry
The home building industry has traditionally been characterized as having relatively low barriers to entry such that there are a large number of firms producing a relatively few number of units per year. Indeed, 79 percent of the builder members of the National Association of Home Builders started 10 or fewer homes in 2010. However, a characteristic of the housing boom from the early 1990s through the mid 2000s is the pronounced growth of market share of a relatively few number of firms, the bulk of which were publicly owned and, to a large extent, financed directly through capital markets rather than financial intermediaries such as banks. This consolidation within the building industry has been discussed by others (see Ambrose (2009 Ambrose ( , 2010 and Frey (2003) ). Below we update some of this prior analysis. In addition, we explore -13 -Finally, we look at whether the capital markets provided more timely signals than the banking industry for builders to start to reduce their activity levels. It is also interesting to note that the 10 largest firms experienced additional large increases in market share over the period from 2006 through 2008. However, this increase occurred when overall sales and prices were declining, and reflected the fact that the large builders had accumulated a large inventory of homes in their production pipelines.
This rapid growth by the largest builders reflected a mix of internal or "organic" growth as well as growth through acquisitions. Table 1 shows the growth in closings by the top 10 builders over the period from 1993 to 2004, and the decomposition by organic versus acquisition.
For the group as a whole, 46 percent of their growth in closings over the 11 year period leading up to the peak was due to acquisitions. As one might expect, there were multiple motivations for these acquisitions. But in conversations with leading analysts of this industry, the prime motivation appears to have been to obtain land and local expertise in promising markets.
There are several dimensions on which large and small builders differ. Small builders are to a large extent reliant on bank financing. Their ability to launch new construction projects and to continue building spec homes depends on the willingness of those banks to extend financing.
The scrutiny of the builder's activities by the lender can be surprisingly intense. In contrast, large builders are much less reliant on banks, obtaining the bulk of their financing through issuance of debt and equity directly in capital markets. Thus, the ability of these large builders to expand their balance sheet is determined by the willingness of markets to advance more funds.
A second distinction is that large builders are vertically integrated from land acquisition and development, construction, marketing, and mortgage financing. This organization helps -14 -these builders exploit scale economies involved in large development projects and to have a broader source of revenues and potential profits. It is also possible that by being involved in each segment of the production and distribution chain, large builders had an informational advantage in the markets they operated in.
To shed light on these points, Figure 18 Almost all of this reduction, 97 percent, was through the lots that they held options on. Options continued to be the dominant adjustment mechanism as well in 2007 with 67 percent of the shrinkage accounted for by optioned lots. It is not until 2008 that the adjustment process is roughly balanced between percentage reductions in owned and optioned lots. Note, however, that lots are only one portion of a builder's inventory. While we do not have data on homes either under construction or completed for these large builders, the macro data indicate that it took quite a bit longer to reduce inventories in those categories.
-15 -Another feature of the increase in housing production from the mid-1990s through the mid-2000s was that an increasing share of single-family units was "built for sale" (Figure 19 ).
Built for sale, sometimes referred to as a "spec" or speculative start, refers to situations where the land and structure are sold in one transaction. An example is when a home builder develops a section of land, putting in roads and utilities, and then begins selling individual lots with houses-either already completed, under construction, or not yet started. In contrast, contractoror owner-built units are cases in which an individual or firm already owns the land and either hires a general contractor or acts as their own general contractor.
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The shift toward more speculative building also meant that even though new housing starts declined abruptly and remain quite low to this day, the home building industry ended up with a large inventory of units in their production pipeline which took quite some time to This review of the macro data and the data on individual firms in the home builder industry suggests that one of the reasons the housing downturn has been so severe and so -16 -prolonged is the industry, particularly the largest firms, built up such substantial inventories of lots and homes at various stages of production. As these largest firms tend to obtain financing from capital markets rather than banks, an interesting question is whether the capital markets were providing any early indications that this inventory represented a significant downside risk to their earning should demand turn out to be weaker than expected. In Figure 22 we compare a fixed weighted index of the equity prices for six large home builders and the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS) data on lending standards for mortgage loans. builders, these comparisons suggests that the capital markets did provide the large builders with a substantially earlier signal to pull back than the small builders likely received from their banks.
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Land Markets during the Boom and Bust
12 In order to create the fixed weight equity index, we collected Bloomberg's market capitalization and equity time series for a subset of homebuilders. Specifically, we selected homebuilders that had a large market presence before the housing bust and are still in operation today. The homebuilders in our equity index are: Toll Brothers Inc., Pulte Group Inc., Lennar Corp., DR Horton Inc., Hovnanian Enterprises Inc., and Beazer Homes USA Inc. Keeping the market capitalization fixed at Q12006, the quarter in which housing starts peaked, we then created a market capitalization weighted average of the quarterly equity prices of each homebuilder. The resulting series was then indexed to equal 100 for the first quarter of 2006.
Builder's use of vacant lot inventories, whether owned outright or optioned, suggests an important role for vacant land as a potential driver of builder costs, and ultimately house prices.
In addition to the cost and access to capital discussed above, the cost of building a new home consists of construction labor and material costs, along with the cost of developable land. Davis and Heathcote (2009) with a housing unit already in place, since the latter reflects the value of the particular structure present, as we argued above and as shown in Figure 1 . In addition, our data allow a parcel-level analysis of the evolving prices and quantities as well as the features of vacant land that was selling in the metro areas for which we have data.
Our land sales data come from the COMPS dataset produced by the CoStar Group. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the great majority of land sold for residential development came from the more elastically-supplied
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We use natural logs because a few markets completely dominate the acreage calculations; plotting acreage itself with consistent axes yields figures that are hard to see in comparison with Atlanta and especially Phoenix.
-18 -MSAs (Figure 26) . In those cities, particularly Atlanta and Phoenix, quarterly sales of 10,000-20,000 acres of land for residential development were common throughout the boom. During 2005, CoStar reported average quarterly land transactions in Phoenix alone that exceeded 50,000 acres. In inelastically supplied cities like Chicago, peak land sales were closer to 3,000 acres a quarter. Land sales volumes in all cities track house prices relatively closely and began to fall quickly after the HPI peaks.
Also shown in Figures 25 and 26 are land price indexes. In order to abstract from changes in the mix of properties being sold over time, we create a quarterly price index that controls for such traits as location, presence of a structure, level of preparation for building, and characteristics of the transaction. The index we employ here is interpretable as the price paid in a standard arms-length transaction for an unimproved square foot of centrally-located residential land relative to some benchmark period (2001Q4) for that city.
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Land prices exhibit some interesting dynamics in these cities. First, as expected given relatively steady increases in building costs during the boom, raw land price increases frequently outstripped house price increases. In constrained markets like New York, Seattle and South Florida, vacant land prices tripled or quadrupled during the boom, as theory would predict.
However, perhaps as evidence of housing prices that were straying from fundamentals, even elastic markets experienced rapid price appreciation during the housing boom. In Denver, for The price dynamics shown in Figures 25 and 26 control for property location, but, like most other information on housing prices, are calculated at the MSA level, making it difficult to determine the price dynamics at different points in the metropolitan landscape. Our data, however, allow a finer look at the geography of the land boom and bust, and Table 5 reports these results for 15 large cities. In each city, a measure of the center is created -typically the tallest building -and land transactions are grouped according to whether they are among the 25% (of plots sold) in closest proximity to the center, the 25% farthest from the center, or the middle 50%.
The mean figures, reported at the bottom of the table, reflect some general tendencies across the cities: during the boom (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) prices rose in all parts of the average metropolitan area; in the bust they fell in all parts. Generally speaking, the boom was the strongest on the fringe, and the bust was weakest there as well. Thus the housing cycle of the 2000s was associated with a flattening of the price gradient in these metros.
But the overall data mask substantial heterogeneity, as the large standard deviations indicate. In some cities -Atlanta, Denver, Phoenix, South Florida -the boom was noticeably concentrated on the fringe. In others, particularly supply-constrained cities like New York, Los Angeles and Seattle, land prices in the center more or less kept pace with price changes on the fringe, leaving the gradient either unchanged or, in some cases, steeper.
Who Got the Profits-Builders or Land Owners
As noted earlier, the large builders likely benefited from scale economies in terms of lower material costs, cheaper funding, and greater production efficiencies. An important question is whether the combination of consolidation among the largest builders and a housing boom led to large builders earning excess returns. To explore this question, we created a monthly equity returns series for publicly traded builders. In each month, we calculate the market capitalizationweighted average equity return by month. Our data runs from January 1990 to May 2012. We -20 -then disaggregate this equity return series into a series for the top-10 builders based on market capitalization in each month, and a series of the non-top-10 builders.
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The market model results are presented in Table 3 . Specifications (1) and (2) report results for the overall builder equity returns, while specifications (3) and (4) focus on the nontop-10 builders and specifications (5) and (6) focus on the top-10 builders. Two things stand out from specification (1). First, the building industry as a whole does not display any higher or lower cyclicality than does the overall market. The estimated beta for the industry is equal to one. Second, for the more than twenty years covered by the data the building industry earned an average annual excess return of 20 percent.
We estimate simple market models by regressing the builder monthly equity return on a market return. We use the Russell 2000 as our market return. 18 Specification (2) Both the large average excess returns overall and the significant increase in these excess returns during the housing boom raise the question of to what extent these excess returns were going to all publicly traded builders or only the largest of the firms. To explore this we turn to our disaggregated return series. Specifications (3) and (4) report results for the non-top-10 builders. The data indicate that outside of the period of the housing boom, the non-top-10 builders did not earn on average any excess returns. However, during the housing boom, they earned average excess returns of 43 percent. In addition, while the overall building industry has a market beta of one, the non-top-10 builders have a market beta of 1.4 which is statistically higher than one. In contrast, looking at specifications (5) and (6) which focus just on the returns for the top-10 builders, the data indicate that they earned on average excess returns of 14 percent outside of the housing boom period, and that these average excess returns increased to 48 percent during the boom -only slightly higher than for the non-top-10 builders.
However, during the housing boom the average annualized excess return increased significantly to 48 percent.
Conclusion
Our description of the supply side of the housing boom and bust cycle of the 2000s reveals many changes in the structure and costs of the homebuilding industry. Many of these developments might have been expected to provide some cushion against the possibility that the housing market would stray far above from fundamental valuations for an extended period. The increased concentration of the industry in the decade leading up to the boom meant that large shares of the market were held by large firms with substantial market information. In addition, these firms' reliance on deep public capital markets, rather than special arrangements with individual financial intermediaries, brought with it close investor and analyst scrutiny of the marketplace and firms' positions and strategies. Smaller builders could easily observe the actions taken by the large builders operating in their markets and to free ride on the market information available to the larger builders. Furthermore, the use of land options by large builders allowed them, if market conditions changed, to exit projects before purchasing land and embarking on difficult-to-reverse building projects. The concentration of new building activity in fast-growing, supply elastic markets in areas like Phoenix and Las Vegas meant that new housing should have helped to limit and then to offset price increases that were originally driven by demand shifts.
Were a housing expert to be told only of these developments, without knowing what actually transpired in the housing market during the 2000s, he might well have taken some comfort that conditions were in place to discourage a market that strayed far from fundamentals.
Yet while many factors may have been expected to constrain price increases and make the supply side of the market more responsive to market conditions, as a whole they were insufficient to forestall both a bubble in prices and a significant oversupply of units. It is impossible to determine how much worse things might have been absent these supply side developments, but it seems clear in retrospect that on their own, favorable supply-side conditions cannot be exclusively relied upon to restrain the effects of major, but temporary, demand shocks. Note: Shading reflects NBER recessions. Data Source: US Bureau of the Census and author's calculations.
-31 - -33 - Note: Shading reflects NBER recessions. Data Source: US Bureau of the Census.
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